

A study on Windows authentication & Prox-Ez

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Who are we?

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Pentesters at Synacktiv

Working for Synacktiv

- Offensive security
- ~140 ninjas: pentest, reverse engineering, development, CSIRT
- 4 locations: Paris, Rennes, Lyon, Toulouse, (soon at Lille) & remote
- We are hiring! \rightarrow apply@synacktiv.com

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Introduction

A little bit of history

- NTLM introduced in 1993 with Windows NT 3.1
- NTLMv2 since Windows NT 4.0 SP4 1998
- But here comes the mighty Kerberos
 - Became a standard in 1993 (v5)
 - Introduced in Windows 2000
- NTLM still widely used nowadays

Introduction

Multiple mitigations against relay

- NTLMv1 \rightarrow v2 (not our focus today)
- NTLM MIC (not our focus today)
- NTLM EPA (Extended Protection for Authentication)
 - Channel Binding
 - Service Binding
- Kerberos
 - Whole new authentication mechanism
 - More complex than NTLM
 - Mutual authentication
 - Fix relay attack



Introduction

Still of interest today

- Lack of (proper) documentation of some topics
- Not supported by all tools
- Lack of tooling for these authentications over HTTP

Prox-Ez

- MitM proxy for Windows authentication over HTTP(s)
- Single file, born to be patched



Agenda

- Quick overview of NTLM
- NTLM and relaying

NTLM-EPA (Extended Protection for Authentication)

- Channel Binding
- Service Binding

What about Kerberos?

- Over HTTP
- Security overview



NTLM

New Technology Lan Manager

- Windows authentication protocol
- Single Sign-On
- Based on challenge/response exchange
- Authenticates a session (TCP connection in case of HTTP)
 - May cause issues/slowdowns with programs that creates new TCP connections for each request


BurpSuite now supports TCP connection reuse





Client's browser


... over HTTP



NTLM

NTLM relaying


- Attacker in a relaying position (able to forward messages from a client)
- Relays the client's authentication to the targeted server



NTLM

NTLM relaying – Over TLS

- Attacker in a relaying position
- Relays the client's authentication to the targeted server





Channel Binding

- Microsoft's solution to protect against MitM attacks
- Used on TLS based communications
- "Binds" the authentication to the outer TLS channel

 \rightarrow Adds a token that depends on the TLS tunnel into the NTLM authentication


- Can be *required* by the server
 - Any client without the proper token are denied access





13

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CBT: Channel Binding Token

- Hash of the server's certificate
- With the hash function used to compute the certificate's signature

Certificate signature's hash function	MD5 / SHA-1	Other hash function	No hash function / multiple hash functions
CBT's hash function	SHA-256	Signature's hash function	Undefined



Channel Bindings attribute

- Derived from the CBT
- Inserted in the NTLM AUTH message
- Cannot be modified
 - Protected by the MIC value (HMAC)
 - \rightarrow protected by the *Flags* attribute
 - \rightarrow protected by NTProofStr
 - \rightarrow protected by the client's secret

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: lab.mylab\r\n
Connection: keep-alive\r\n
Cache-Control: max-age=0\r\n
[truncated]Authorization: NTLM T1RMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAFgAAAAEAQQBcAAAAAAAAB0AQAACAAIAHQBAA
 NTLM Secure Service Provider
NTLMSSP identifier: NTLMSSP
NTLM Message Type: NTLMSSP_AUTH (0x00000003)
▶ Lan Manager Response: 000000000000000000000000000000000000
LMv2 Client Challenge: 000000000000000
• NTLM Response: f4759ae9f42a05e0205987f244a0e96f0101000000000000d473c5e28b37d7014e8aec
Length: 260
Maxlen: 260
Offset: 112
• NTLMv2 Response: f4759ae9f42a05e0205987f244a0e96f0101000000000000d473c5e28b37d7014e
NTProofStr: f4759ae9f42a05e0205987f244a0e96f
Response Version: 1
Hi Response Version: 1
Z: 00000000000
Time: Apr 22, 2021 15:26:37.529186000 UTC
NTLMv2 Client Challenge: 4e8aec4f6d936e28
Z: 00000000
Attribute: NetBIOS domain name: DESKTOP-OUBJGUL
Attribute: NetBIOS computer name: DESKTOP-OUBJGUL
▶ Attribute: DNS domain name: DESKTOP-OUBJGUL
Attribute: DNS computer name: DESKTOP-OUBJGUL
▶ Attribute: Timestamp
Attribute: Elags
✓ Attribute: Channel Bindings
NTLMV2 Response Item Type: Channel Bindings (0x000a)
NTLMV2 Response Item Length: 16
Channel Bindings: 45f5a466fcaf1531df8e70317a5ee4d3
▶ ALLIIDULE, TALYEL NAME, HIP/LAD.MYLAD
Attribute: End of list
7, 00000000

in name: NULL name: user Host name: Wololo

Channel Binding

• Still not supported by many clients \rightarrow no authentication possible if EPA is required

• How to use our tools against EPA protected websites?



Mitm Proxy — Prox-EZ ("prox easy")


Why?


- Be able to use any tool against HTTP(s) servers using
 - NTLM
 - NTLM-EPA
 - Kerberos
- Be able to control the authentication

Mitm Proxy — Prox-EZ ("prox easy")

How?

- Has to work with TLS
 - \rightarrow TLS interception
 - ightarrow Register a custom certificate authority on the client
 - \rightarrow Generate on-the-fly certificates
- Good documentation on *mitmproxy* website





Mitm Proxy — Prox-Ez ("prox easy")





Microsoft Active Directory Cox +	\odot	[Prox-Ez Demo] \$ python3 proxy.py -dc 'ff.dom/brian'hashes ':07F815240CEE92438FF7B317F282BD02' INF0:Proxy:Proxy socket bound, listening on 127.0.0.1:3128.
$\leftarrow \rightarrow \mathbb{C} \qquad \bigcirc \ \land \ https://win2019dc01.ff.dom/certsrv/ \qquad \blacksquare \ \clubsuit$	⊠ ≡ 1	INFO:Proxy:Got connection from 127.0.0.1:50388.
Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services ff-WIN2019DC01-CA-1	<u>Home</u>	
Welcome		
Use this Web site to request a certificate for your Web browser, e-mail client, or other program. By using a certificate, you c your identity to people you communicate with over the Web, sign and encrypt messages, and, depending upon the type of you request, perform other security tasks.		
You can also use this Web site to download a certificate authority (CA) certificate, certificate chain, or certificate revocation (CRL), or to view the status of a pending request.	list	
For more information about Active Directory Certificate Services, see <u>Active Directory Certificate Services Documentation</u> .		
Select a task: <u>Request a certificate</u> <u>View the status of a pending certificate request</u> <u>Download a CA certificate, certificate chain, or CRL</u>		



Mitm Proxy — Prox-Ez ("prox easy")



Demo

• Private Browsing ×	+	○ [Prox INFO:	x-Ez Demo] \$ python3 proxy.py -dc 'ff.dom/brian'hashes ':07F815240CE :Proxy:Proxy socket bound, listening on 127.0.0.1:3128.	E92438FF7B317F282BD02'no-epa
$\leftarrow \rightarrow x$ Q https	s://win2019dc01. ff.dom /certsrv/	INFO:	:Proxy:Got connection from 127.0.0.1:60828. R:Proxy:Error while performing authentication, stopping. Error details:	
	win2019dc01.ff.dom This site is asking you to sign in. Username	y bad	d credéntials or server does not support NTLM´or bad EPA (chanel bindir	ıg or service binding).
	Password Cancel Sign in			



- Channel Binding requires TLS, now what about plain HTTP?
 - (Don't do plain HTTP)
- Microsoft implemented a new protection
 - Service Binding
- Same objective as Channel Binding \rightarrow Prevent MitM attacks

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Service Binding

New attribute in the NTLM AUTH message

Identifies the targeted resource

	709 3784.5819019 10.137.0.61	10.137.0.47	HTTP	332 HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized , NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE (text/html)			
	710 3784.5819745 10.137.0.47	10.137.0.61	TCP	56 47442 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1806 Ack=6198 Win=62848 Len=0			
	711 3784.5820976 10.137.0.47	10.137.0.61	HTTP	1068 GET / HTTP/1.1 , NTLMSSP AUTH, User: ff.dom\brian			
	712 3784.6008005 10.137.0.61	10.137.0.47	TCP	56 80 → 47442 [ACK] Seg=6198 Ack=2818 Win=2102272 Len=0			
-	713 3784.7048618 10.137.0.61	10.137.0.47	HTTP	1006 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)			
	714 3784.7261469 10.137.0.61	10.137.0.47	ТСР	1006 [TCP Retransmission] 80 → 47442 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6198 Ack=2818			
	715 3784.7261754 10.137.0.47	10.137.0.61	TCP	68 47442 → 80 [ACK] Seg=2818 Ack=7148 Win=64128 Len=0 SLE=6198			
	716 3784.7519562 10.137.0.47	10.137.0.61	HTTP	471 GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1			
	Offset: 112						
	TLMv2 Response: 3ea30ac48	2a5dffd7109d3c4b0b2b	fa2010100000	0000000aaad3e9b46fbd801cbb9072b			
	NTProofStr: 3ea30ac482a						
	Response Version: 1						
	Hi Response Version: 1						
	Z: 00000000000						
	Time: Nov 18, 2022 12:0	9:27.828829800 UTC					
	NTLMv2 Client Challenge						
	Z: 00000000						
	Attribute: NetBIOS doma	in name: FF					
	Attribute: NetBIOS computer name: WIN2019SRV01						
	Attribute: DNS domain n						
	Attribute: DNS computer	name: WIN2019SRV01.	ff.dom				
	Attribute: DNS tree nam	e: ff.dom					
	Attribute: Timestamp						
	Attribute: Flags						
	Attribute: Chappel Bindings						
	 Attribute: Target Name: 	HTTP/win2019srv01.f	f.dom				
	NTLMV2 Response Item						
	NTLMV2 Response Item		· · ·				
	Target Name: HTTP/wi						
	Attribute. End of list						
	NTLMV2 Resnanse Item	Type: End of list (0x0000)				

Service Binding

New attribute in the NTLM AUTH message

- Identifies the targeted resource
- Taken from the browser URL

 	+•	711 3784.5820976 10.137.0.47 712 3784.6008005 10.137.0.61	10.137.0.61 10.137.0.47	HTTP TCP	56 80 → 4	47442 [ACK]	NTLMSSP_AUTH, Seq=6198 Ack=				
715 3784.7261754_10.137.0.47 10.137.0.61 TCP 68 47442 - 80 [ACK] Seq=2818 Ack=7148 Win=64128 Len=0 SLE=6198 0ffset: 112 • NTLMV2 Response: 3ea30ac482a5dffd71090d3c4b0b2bfa20100000000000000000000000000000000000	-	713 3784.7048618 10.137.0.61	10.137.0.47	HTTP					ACK1 Son-6	100 Ack-2010	
<pre> T16 3784.7519582 10.137.0.47 10.137.0.61 HTTP 471 GFT / favicon.ic0 HTTP/1.1 Offset: 112</pre>											
<pre>Offset: 112</pre>								-7140 Will	-04120 Len	1-0 SEC-0150	
<pre>Z: 00000000 Attribute: NetBIOS domain name: FF Attribute: NetBIOS computer name: WIN2019SRV01 Attribute: DNS domain name: ff.dom Attribute: DNS computer name: WIN2019SRV01.ff.dom Attribute: DNS tree name: ff.dom Attribute: Timestamp Attribute: Channel Rindings Attribute: Channel Rindings Attribute: Target Name: HTTP/win2019srv01.ff.dom NTLMV2 Response Item Type: Target Name (0x0009) NTLMV2 Response Item Length: 48 Target Name: HTTP/win2019srv01.ff.dom Attribute: End of list</pre> win2019srv01.ff.dom/ × +		 NTLMv2 Response: 3ea30ac48 NTProofStr: 3ea30ac482a Response Version: 1 Hi Response Version: 1 Z: 000000000000 Time: Nov 18, 2022 12:0 	5dffd7109d3c4b0b2bfa2 9:27.828829800 UTC		000000aaad36	e9b46fbd801c	cbb9072b				
 Attribute: DNS domain name: ff.dom Attribute: DNS computer name: WIN2019SRV01.ff.dom Attribute: DNS tree name: ff.dom Attribute: Timestamp Attribute: Flags Attribute: Target Name: HTTP/win2019srv01.ff.dom NTLMV2 Response Item Type: Target Name (0x0009) NTLMV2 Response Item Length: 48 Target Name: HTTP/win2019srv01.ff.dom Attribute: End of list 		Z: 00000000 > Attribute: NetBIOS doma	in name: FF	01		win2019	9srv01.ff.do	om/	×	+	
 Attribute: Flags Attribute: Channel Bindings Attribute: Target Name: HTTP/win2019srv01.ff.dom NTLMV2 Response Item Type: Target Name (0x0009) NTLMV2 Response Item Length: 48 Target Name: HTTP/win2019srv01.ff.dom Attribute: End of list 		 Attribute: DNS domain n Attribute: DNS computer Attribute: DNS tree nam 	ame: ff.dom name: WIN2019SRV01.f			\leftarrow \rightarrow) C		08	win2019	srv01.ff.dom
Attribute. End of list		 Attribute: Flags Attribute: Channel Bind Attribute: Target Name: NTLMV2 Response Item NTLMV2 Response Item 	HTTP/win2019srv01.ff Type: Target Name (0 Length: 48		_	Welco	ome ho	ome!			
		 Attribute. End of list 									

- New attribute in the NTLM AUTH message
 - Identifies the targeted resource
 - Taken from the browser URL
- If the authentication targets another server than the one receiving the authentication \rightarrow denied access



- The web server needs to be configured with the proper SPNs
 - No implicit SPN
 - All the alternative DNS records
- Bad integration in IIS
 - No graphical option
 - Manual modification of C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\Config




```
# C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\Config
<location path="Default Web Site">
  <system.webServer>
    <security>
      <authentication>
        <windowsAuthentication enabled="true" useKernelMode="false">
          <providers>
            <clear />
            <add value="NTLM" />
          </providers>
          <extendedProtection tokenChecking="Require" flags="Proxy,ProxyCohosting">
            <spn name="HTTP/win2019srv01.ff.dom" />
          </extendedProtection>
        </windowsAuthentication>
        <anonymousAuthentication enabled="false" />
      </authentication>
    </security>
  </system.webServer>
</location>
```



Service Binding

<i>flags</i> options	Behavior	Remark
Empty / None	Only verify CBT	HTTP is not protected ; HTTPs is protected
Proxy	Only verify SPN	HTTP is not working (no authentication possible) ; HTTPs is protected
Proxy,ProxyCohosting	Only verify SPN	Both HTTP and HTTPs are protected and work
Proxy,NoServiceNameCheck	Does not verify anything	HTTP is not working (no authentication possible) ; HTTPs is not protected but a SPN has to be provided (any value)
Proxy,ProxyCohosting,NoServiceNameCheck	Does not verify anything	Both HTTP and HTTPs are not protected (no SPN required)

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- Service Binding configuration is cumbersome
- Default EPA configuration \rightarrow Service Binding not enforced
- Enforced EPA but plain HTTP available \rightarrow vulnerable to MitM attacks



MitM Proxy — Prox-Ez ("prox easy")

Even if not widely used

This site is asking you to sign in.

Username

Prox-Ez implements EPA-Service binding


win2019srv01.ff.dom/ × +			•	[Prox-Ez Demo] \$ python3 proxy.py -dc 'ff.dom/brian:mysuperpassword1!' INF0:Proxy:Proxy socket bound, listening on 127.0.0.1:3128.
$\leftrightarrow \rightarrow C$ () A https://win2019srv01.ff.dom		☆	≡	INFO:Proxy:Got connection from 127.0.0.1:45602.
Welcome home!				
• win2019srv01.ff.dom/ × +				ython3 proxy.py -dc 'ff.dom/brian:mysuperpassword1!'spn HTTP/test.com ocket bound, listening on 127.0.0.1:3128.
$\leftarrow \rightarrow \times$ O A https://win2019srv01.ff.dom	☆			nection from 127.0.0.1:38226. while performing authentication, stopping. Error details: Authentication failed, probab:
Welcome home!				or server does not support NTLM or bad EPA (chanel binding or service binding).

INFO:Proxy:Got connection from 127.0.0.1:38236.



Why Kerberos ?


- Microsoft recommend enabling EPA as primary mitigation against relay attack (such as PetitPotam)
- In addition, disable NTLM and replace it by Kerberos
- Kerberos feature "Mutual Authentication"





...over HTTP?

- Similar to NTLM
- The client sent the AP_REQ in a specific header





Let's have a closer look

✓ Hypertext Transfer Protocol
> GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: win-gc9km3m6ipp.domaintest.local\r\n
Connection: keep-alive\r\n
Gene-Control: max-age=o(r\n
Ctruncated]Authorization: Negotiate YIIHUWYGKWYBBQUC0IIHtzCCB80g/DAuBgkqhkiC9xIBAgIGCSqG5Ib3EgECAgYKKWYBBAGCNwICHgYKKWYBBAGCNwICCqKCBw@EggcJYIIHBQYJK 655 API Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.2 (SPNEGO - Simple Protected Negotiation)
Simple Protected Negotiation
/ negTokenInit
> mechTypes: 4 items
mechToken: 6082070506092#864886f71201020201006e8206f4308206
✓ krb5 blob: 6082070506092a864886f71201020201006e8206f4308206
KR85 0ID: 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 (KR85 - Kerberos 5)
krb5 tok id: KRB5 AP REQ (0x8001)
✓ Kerberos
v ap-req
pyno: 5
msg-type: krb-ap-reg (14)
Padding. 0
> ap-options: 20000000 (mutual-required)
V ticket
tkt-vno: 5
reals: DOMAINTEST.LOCAL
Y sname
name-type: kRB5-NT-SRV-INST (2)
v sname-string: 2 items
SNameString: HTTP
SNameString: WIN-GC9KM3M6IPP.domaintest.local
> enc-part
✓ authenticator
etype: eTYPE-AE5256-CT5-HMAC-SMA1-96 (18)
cipher: a2e320e3a8bfd7c5513a2665a329e0e2d56fdeb90bd99b13
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\r\n
User-Agent: Norilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\r\n
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xhlg=0.9,image/avif,image/avif,image/appl,"/";g=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;g=0.9\r\n
Accept-Encoding: grip, deflate/r/n

Accept-Language: fr-FR, fr;q=0.9, en-US;q=0.8, en;q=0.7\r\n

If-None-Match: "bfb5837cd4f1d71:0"\r\n

If-Modified-Since: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 16:54:55 GMT\r\n



Let's have a closer look

> HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified\r\n						
Accept-Ranges: bytes\r\n						
ETag: "bfb5837cd4f1d71:0"\r\n						
Server: Hierosoft IIS/10.0\r\n						
[truncated]WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate oYG1MIGyoAMKAQChCwYJKoZIgvcSAQICooGdBIGaYIGXBgkqhkiG9xIE						
✓ GSS-API Generic Security Service Application Program Intertace						
Simple Protected Megotiation						
✓ negTokenTarg						
negResult: accept-completed (0)						
<pre>supportedMech: 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2 (MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5)</pre>						
responseToken: 60819706092a864886f71201020202006f8187308184a003						
krb5_blob: 60819706092a864886f71201020202006f8187308184a003						
KR85 0ID: 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 (KR85 - Kerberos 5)						
krb5_tok_id: KRB5_AP_REP (0x0002)						
✓ Kerberos						
✓ ap-rep						
pvno: 5						
mag type: krb op rep (15)						
✓ enc-part						
etype: eTYPE-AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (18)						
cipher: 48ed6d1e0cbb92b30df00ba8b9432c0494d9cd1b1fe376e3						
Persistent-Auth: true\r\n						
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET\r\n						
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 18:07:36 GMT\r\n						
\r\n						
[HTTP response 3/4]						
[Time since request: 0.055348000 seconds]						




Security overview

- Two security measures to prevent replay attack
 - AP_REQ contain a timestamp : <5min
 - Host stores a MD5 hash of each AP_REQ : KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT
 - AP_REQ contains SPN of the service : Not verified



Security overview


Relay on a server using the same identity





Security overview

Replay on another server using the same identity





Why do we need a proxy

• Still not supported by many clients (Firefox, ...) \rightarrow No authentication possible if Kerberos is enforced

- How to use our tools against Kerberos protected websites?
 - BurpSuite
 - Certipy
 - ••••



Mitm Proxy — Prox-Ez ("prox easy")

Prox-EZ implement Kerberos authentication

- Standard user/password capabilities
- Pass-the-ticket capabilities (from TGT or ST)
- Overpass-the-hash capabilities (from the NT hash)



Mitm Proxy — Prox-Ez ("prox easy")

Demo

Microsoft Active Directo	ry Cex +		0	[Prox-Ez Demo] \$ getTGT.py 'ff.dom/brian:mysuperpassword1!' Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation
$\leftarrow \ \rightarrow \ {\tt G}$	O A https://win2019dc01. ff.dom /certsrv/	8 ☆	⊚ ≡	[*] Saving ticket in brian.ccache
Microsoft Active Directory	Certificate Services ff-WIN2019DC01-CA-1		<u>Home</u>	[Prox-Ez Demo] \$ export KRB5CCNAME=brian.ccache [Prox-Ez Demo] \$ klist
Welcome Use this Web site to re- your identity to people you request, perform o You can also use this V (CRL), or to view the sit For more information a Select a task: Request a certificate View the status of a	equest a certificate for your Web browser, e-mail client, or other program. By usin you communicate with over the Web, sign and encrypt messages, and, dependi ther security tasks. Web site to download a certificate authority (CA) certificate, certificate chain, or c tatus of a pending request. About Active Directory Certificate Services, see <u>Active Directory Certificate Servic</u>	ng upon the type of certificate revocation	can verify f certificate n list	<pre>[Prox-Ez Demo] \$ klist Ticket cache: FILE:brian.ccache Default principal: brian@FF.DOM Valid starting Expires Service principal 04/19/2023 16:27:42 04/20/2023 02:27:42 krbtgt/FF.DOM@FF.DOM renew until 04/20/2023 16:27:42 [Prox-Ez Demo] \$ python3 proxy.py -dc 'ff.dom/brian' -k -d DEBUG:Proxy:Entered proxy, creating sockets. DEBUG:Proxy:Entered proxy, creating sockets. DEBUG:Proxy:Proxy socket created. DEBUG:Proxy:Proxy socket bound, listening on 127.0.0.1:3128. INF0:Proxy:Got connection from 127.0.0.1:43272. DEBUG:Proxy:Creating new process. DEBUG:Proxy:Creating new process. DEBUG:Proxy.Client<->ProxyHelper:Creating new ClientToProxyHelper DEBUG:Proxy.Client<->ProxyHelper:Our state: IDLE; their state: IDLE DEBUG:Proxy.Client<->ProxyHelper:Received CONNECT win2019dc01.ff.dom:443 HTTP/1.1 user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0</pre>
				proxy-connection: keep-alive connection: keep-alive host: win2019dc01.ff.dom:443

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Mitm Proxy — Prox-EZ ("prox easy")

• Available on GitHub:

- https://github.com/synacktiv/Prox-Ez
- PR & issues are welcome
- i≘ README.md

Prox-Ez: The Swiss Army Knife of HTTP auth

This HTTP proxy handles all HTTP authentications on your behalf.

It supports NTLM EPA (channel binding and service binding), kerberos, pass-the-hash, overpass-the-hash (pass-the-key) and pass-the-ticket (TGT and TGS).



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Any question?

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